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REGULATION AND LIBERALIZATION OF
IMPORTS AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT
AND THE ROLE OF TRADE ACTIONS

IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
David A. Laverty*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Korea is well-known for its exceptionally successful export-driven economy and for the role of the Korean government
in actively pursuing policies which have fostered the growth of Korean
industry and the penetration of Korean products in the international
marketplace. This rapid penetration of Korean products has been a
source of tension among Korea's trading partners as they have sought
to respond to calls from their domestic-industry constituencies for
protection from the increased importation of Korean products. However, less well-known and of increasing significance to Korea itself and
to the international community is not the outflow of Korean products
but the dramatic shift in the flow of goods into Korea. This increase
in imports into Korea is the result of major structural shifts in the
Korean economy and a greatly strengthened domestic appetite for foreign raw materials, capital goods, and consumer goods. Coupled with
this increase in import activity have been broad changes in the level
and nature of direct foreign investment activity in Korea, in part suggesting an increase in activity in service sectors such as insurance and
advertising.
The liberalization of Korea's regulation of imports and investment
has been a central factor behind the recent trends in import and foreign investment activity and has come about for a number of reasons,
including the desire to reduce market-distorting effects of import and
investment restrictions on the allocation of resources and the need to
expose protected industries to international competition. In addition,
the process has been accelerated in response to pressure from Korea's
trading partners, particularly the United States.
* Attorney, Marks Murase & White, New York; J.D. University of Michigan, 1984. The
author recently returned from Seoul, Korea, where he was affiliated with the law firm of Lee &
Ko for three years. The author is indebted to numerous Korean attorneys for their advice and
research assistance and wishes to thank, in particular, Messrs. Kim, Kie Chang and Kang, Jae
Hoon.
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This liberalization process of both imports and investment deserves
parallel examination since the liberalization of each will affect the
other and since the two regimes share similar characteristics. Changes
in the legal regime governing imports will affect the flow of foreign
investment into Korea just as surely as changes in the regulation of
foreign investment will affect the quantity and character of imports
coming to Korea. Furthermore, the regimes governing both imports
and foreign investment, particularly their approval processes, together
reveal the Korean government's active role in regulating the economy.
Finally, the liberalization of the import regime will continue to be
resisted by various sectors in Korea which believe that their interests
are threatened by the greater competition from foreign products. One
of the possible responses of affected domestic industries and other
groups is to make greater use of Korea's unfair trade practice laws and
safeguard-type actions. Thus, both because these laws may begin to
play a greater role in Korea and because of the international community's concern with the proliferation and development of individualcountry laws that may affect the free flow of goods and even services,
the role of Korea's principal trade actions deserves some attention.
Given this background, the modest goal of this article is to broadly
capture the current state of Korea's rapidly developing legal system
governing imports and foreign investment and to introduce Korea's
developing trade actions. Section II of this article will describe the
overall structure of Korea's regulation of imports and foreign investment, provide historical background on the liberalization of both regimes, and discuss certain recent liberalization developments. Section
III will then analyze the contours of Korea's more important unfair
trade practice and safeguard laws, with some emphasis on the principal differences between the antidumping laws of Korea and the United
States.
II.

THE REGULATION AND LIBERALIZATION OF IMPORTS AND

FOREIGN INVESTMENT

A.

Regulation of Imports and LiberalizationMeasures

The increase in the import of goods has been evident over the last
several years, particularly since the early 1980's. This trend has been
visible both in Korea's overall trade balance and in Korea's trade balance with the United States. Korea's overall import growth over the
last years has been steady, increasing from US$22.3 billion in 1980 to
US$31.1 billion in 1985, and particularly strong very recently, rising
from US$31.6 billion in 1986 to US$41.0 billion in 1987 and then to
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US$51.8 billion in 1988, when imports increased by 26.3 percent over
1987.1 Imports during the first ten months of 1989 amounted to
US$50.4 billion, representing a 19.0 percent increase over the same
period of 1988. Imports from the United States, after increasing to
US$4.9 billion in 1980, expanded to approximately US$6.5 billion in
both 1985 and 1986, then rose to US$8.8 billion in 1987 and US$12.8
billion in 1988, an increase of 45.7 percent over the previous year. Imports from the United States during the first ten months of 1989 stood
at US$13.0 billion, a 26.2 percent increase over the same period of
1988.2
While many factors contributed to this trend, Korea's liberalization of restrictions on the import of goods has been indispensable. The
object of this section of the article is to analyze the legal regime by
which Korea controls the importation of goods, provide some historical perspective to Korea's liberalization of this regime and note certain
areas that may be further liberalized.
1. The Foreign Trade Act and the Regulation of Imports
The Foreign Trade Act 3 sets forth the legal structure which underlies Korea's system of import control. Unless an import transaction is
eligible for a special exemption, it generally requires an import license.
The basic authority for this requirement is found at article 19(1) of the
Foreign Trade Act which provides that: "[a]ny person who desires to
export or import goods shall obtain the approval of the Minister of
Trade and Industry with respect to goods concerned, form of transaction, method of settlement in price, etc. under the conditions as prescribed by the Presidential Decree."'4 The Enforcement Decree of the
Foreign Trade Act ("FTA Decree") 5 identifies the various limited exemptions to.the approval otherwise required by article 19(1) of the Act
which may apply, for example, to specified goods that are imported
6
gratuitously.
Goods not exempted from approval are either "negative-list" items
that are restricted or prohibited or goods eligible for the "automatic
approval" of an import license ("AA items"). While the restricted
1.
Trade
2.
3.

The author has compiled these statistics from reports of the Rep. of Korea, Ministry of
and Industry.
Id.
Foreign Trade Act, Law No. 3895 (1986), amended by Law No. 4145 (1989).

4. Id. art. 19(1).

5. Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Trade Act, Presidential Decree No. 12,191 (June 30,
1987), amended by Presidential Decree No. 12,590 (Dec. 31, 1988) [hereinafter FTA Decree].

6. Id. art. 33.
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items from the negative list may be approved on a case-by-case basis,
all other non-prohibited goods are AA items. The Minister of Trade
and Industry must designate such restricted, prohibited and AA classifications in an export and import public notice ("General Export and
Import Notice"). 7 This General Export and Import Notice must specify which restrictions apply to restricted items, such as in connection
with quantity, standards and geographical area. The Notice must also
set forth the procedure for the recommendation and confirmation of
the export or import of such restricted items.
Pursuant to this regulatory framework, the importer is required to
fill out an application for an import license for each import transaction
and submit it together with a contract or evidence of a firm offer to a
foreign exchange bank, which will actually issue a license for most
import items in accordance with its approval authority delegated by
the Minister of Trade and Industry. If the item is an AA item, the
license will be issued without any specific formality. For restricted
items, the importer usually must obtain a recommendation from the
relevant ministry or the endorsement of a specialized association
before applying for the import license.
In addition to the basic distinction between negative list and AA
items specified in the General Export and Import Notice, imports may
be subject to certain other restrictions, the most significant of which
are set forth in three separate public notices. First, a "consolidated
public notice" ("Consolidated Notice") consolidates export and import requirements that have been set forth by laws and regulations
outside of the Foreign Trade Act. 8 The Consolidated Notice covers a
wide range of restrictions pertaining to concerns such as the maintenance of quality and the protection of public health and safety which
may apply to imports of designated medicaments, medical equipment,
food products and additives, fertilizer, livestock, electric appliances,
and several other categories of goods.
Second, a separate public notice on imports and exports ("Separate
Notice") contains several provisions pertaining to the export and import of goods. 9 Chapter I of the Separate Notice, for example, includes regulations that restrict the export and import of used goods,
allowing the import of used goods only in certain very limited circum7. Foreign Trade Act, art. 18. A recent version of this notice is Ministry of Trade and Industry Notification No. 89-40 (Dec. 9, 1989).
8. Foreign Trade Act, art. 18(2). A recent such notice is Ministry of Trade and Industry
Notification No. 89-85 (Mar. 8, 1989), amended by Notification No. 89-86 (Dec. 28, 1989).
9. FTA Decree, art. 35. A recent such notice is Ministry of Finance Notification No. 89-33
(Oct. 10, 1989).
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stances, such as if machinery or equipment has been previously used
by a company in overseas construction. The Separate Notice also specifically restricts the import of raw materials, machinery and other
goods to be used in the defense industry (Chapter VI) and the import
of aircraft and parts thereof (Chapter VII), pursuant to article 35 of
the FTA Decree, subparagraphs 3 and 4, respectively.
Third, a public notice on the diversification of import countries
("Diversification Notice") 10 restricts the import of certain items if
they are imported from a country with which Korea has an unfavorable and long-standing trade imbalance. Authority for such restrictions
is found in article 35(5) of the FTA Decree which authorizes the establishment of conditions to the "[i]mport of goods in order to maintain a balance between export and import for each country." The
resultant Diversification Notice which establishes such conditions
states that restrictions apply to imports from the country with which
Korea has the largest trade deficit during the preceding five-year period. At present, this country is Japan. In order to receive import
licenses for goods to which this Diversification Notice applies and
which are not specially exempted, importers need the recommendation
of the Association of Foreign Trading Agents of Korea, a private industry association in Korea.
The purpose of such a restriction on the import of certain goods
from a trade-imbalance country is to diversify Korea's sources of imports. It has been noted that the United States and other countries
which do not have a large bilateral trade surplus with Korea are actually beneficiaries of this system, since traders from these countries are
not subject to restrictions which may face their competitors from
Japan. II
In practice, the tariff schedules of the Republic of Korea list all
categories of goods according to their harmonized commodity description and coding system designations ("H.S. Numbers"). The tariff
schedules set forth tariff rates, indicate for each ten-digit H.S. Number
whether the item is on the negative list as restricted or prohibited, and
note whether any other restrictions may apply to the import of the
item, such as the restrictions described in the Consolidated, Separate
or Diversification Notices.
10. A recent such notice is Ministry of Trade and Industry Notification No. 89-6 (Mar. 24,
1989).
11. See Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, USITC Pub. 1720 (July 1989).
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2. Liberalization of Import Regulations
The negative list system of import licensing was adopted by Korea
in 1967 shortly after Korea became a signatory of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). Prior to July, 1967, Korea
followed a positive list system, originally adopted in 1955, under
which only those items specifically listed could be automatically approved. While Korea experimented with import liberalization in the
late 1970's when the economy began to improve, the liberalization was
suspended due to Korea's deteriorating balance of payments resulting
from the oil crises and an industrial policy that emphasized import
substitution.1 2 As its trade deficit shrank and industries strengthened,
Korea seriously began to dismantle the import-licensing process and
further liberalize the importation of goods in the early 1980's. 13 At
the end of 1984, the 1982-86 five-year economic and social development plan was revised and a strategy was adopted to liberalize the
economy both internally and externally and to introduce greater competition in all sectors by relying more heavily on the market mechanism. 14 At that time, the government adopted a program of
accelerated import and foreign investment liberalization and tariff reduction, in part to expose protected domestic industries to external
competition, thereby forcing them to improve their efficiency and
product quality.1 5 The government announced that the import liberalization ratio would be gradually increased and specified the details of
this liberalization to allow domestic and foreign firms time to prepare
themselves for the scheduled market opening. 16 This general import
liberalization process was accelerated in 1986, the year of Korea's first
trade surplus.
The process of liberalization was continued with the adoption on
December 31, 1986 of the Foreign Trade Act, which took effect on
July 1, 1987. The Foreign Trade Act replaced the Trade Transactions
Act of 1967 as the basic governing law on trade matters. While the
Foreign Trade Act continues the former Act's practice of requiring
approval for each import transaction, the Foreign Trade Act was intended to phase out restrictions on imports and exports, to establish an
12. Kim,

KOREA'S MARKET OPENING POLICY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, SPECIAL SEMI-

NAR ON CURRENT BUSINESS ISSUES IN KOREA, KOR.-AM. BUS. INST. 3 (1987).
13. Kim, NEW GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY, ANNUAL SEMINAR ON

DOING BUSINESS IN KOREA, KOR.-AM. Bus. INST. 2 (1989).

14. Kim,

KOREA'S TRADE POLICY, ANNUAL SEMINAR ON DOING BUSINESS

KOR.-AM. BUS. INST. 12 (1986).

15. Id.
16. Id.

IN KOREA,
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institutional framework to cope with possible temporary increases in
imports, and to simplify certain aspects of the trade system.
Yet another important regulatory change affecting the import of
goods took place on January 1, 1989, when the Import Surveillance
System was abolished. In the process of liberalizing the import of
goods, Korea had instituted certain procedures designed to soften the
impact of newly liberalized AA items. Chief among these procedures
was the Import Surveillance System, adopted in 1977, under which
newly liberalized AA items were kept under surveillance to determine
their impact on the domestic market. 17 The import of these items required the prior confirmation by the Association of Foreign Trading
Agents of Korea before the items could receive an import license.
Items on the surveillance list were eventually to be given full automatic approval status or returned to the restricted list. The involvement of an industry association in confirming the goods before import
licenses would be granted ensured the likelihood that imports of products under surveillance would not increase. In part due to outside
pressure on Korea to mitigate the effects of the Import Surveillance
System, the Korean government reduced the number of items under
surveillance during the 1980's and abolished the System on January 1,
1989.
As a result of this liberalization process, the percentage of import
items subject to "automatic approval" has greatly increased. The
number of items subject to negative list prohibitions or restrictions, as
categorized by the 10-digit H.S. Numbers, was 465 as of July, 1989.18
Thus, since there are a total of 10,241 categories of goods, the socalled import liberalization ratio - the percentage of categories of
goods which have been liberalized - is 95.5 percent. This ratio has
steadily increased from 68.6 percent in 1980 to 80.4 percent in 1983
and 91.5 percent in 1986.19 The remaining import-restricted products
subject to case-by-case approval are primarily agricultural products.
Even more impressively, among the 8,456 categories of manufactured
goods, only 39 items are restricted, for an import liberalization ratio of
99.6 percent. 20 The Korean government has indicated that it will liberalize further during the 1989-91 period, removing restrictions on all
but ten of the manufactured products and raising the agricultural lib17. See REP. OF KOREA MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, FREE AND FAIR TRADE:

KOREA'S RECORD AND COMMITMENT 22 (1989) [hereinafter FREE AND FAIR TRADE]; Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, supra note 11, at 127.
18. These statistics are the author's compilations from various Ministry of Trade and Industry sources.
19. Id.

20. Id.
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eralization ratio to 85% by January 1, 1991.21
Apart from the relatively few products which are still subject to
negative-list restrictions, some of Korea's trading partners have argued that other aspects of Korea's regulatory system may have the
effect of hindering imports. For example, certain trading partners have
raised exception to pre-import reporting and notification requirements
found in several individual laws, under which an importer is required
to report or notify its intent to import particular items to a ministry or
an industry association and may also be required to file background
documents. The United States took issue with such requirements in
the recent "Super 301" negotiations with the Korean government that
resulted in a May 19, 1989 exchange of letters between the governments of Korea and the United States.22 While these letter agreements
have no specific effect until their provisions are implemented, the
Super 301 Import Agreement states in part that Korea will implement
a plan to reduce or eliminate pre-import reporting or notification requirements, phase out participation of industry associations in the preimport system, 23 and simplify documentation requirements to assure
24
that pre-import approval is issued expeditiously.
Some trading partners have also argued that aspects of Korea's
system of special laws regulating the import of various goods for the
maintenance of quality or the protection of public health and safety or
national security, as reflected in the Consolidated Notice, may also
have the effect of hindering imports. Though these laws include internationally accepted standards for health and safety, the Korean government has announced that aspects of the provisions which have been
allegedly used to restrict imports are under review and have been liberalized.215 The United States raised the issue of these trade-related standards and technical regulations in the Super 301 negotiations, and the
Korean government agreed in part to notify GATT of any trade-related standards and technical regulations which are not based on well21. Id.

22. See Letters between Korean Ambassador Tong-Jin Park and U.S. Trade Representative
Carla A. Hills (May 19, 1989) [hereinafter referred to as "Super 301 Import Agreement"] (covering Import Restrictions, Standards, and General Provisions), and Letters between Korean Ambassador Tong-Jin Park and U.S. Trade Representative Carla A. Hills (May 19, 1989)
[hereinafter referred to as "Super 301 Investment Agreement"] (covering Performance Requirements, Liberalization Measures, Time Frame for Approval of Investment Applications, Establishment Procedures, and General Provisions).
23. Super 301 Import Agreement, supra note 22, para. A(8).
24. Id. para. A(10).
25. FREE AND FAIR TRADE, supra note 17, at 22-23.
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recognized international standards or which deviate from those
26
standards.
B.

Regulation of Foreign Investment and
Liberalization Measures

Korea's regulation of foreign investment has also been greatly liberalized in parallel with the liberalization of restrictions on the importation of goods. As with the liberalization of the import of goods,
much of the change in foreign investment regulation has been selfinitiated by Korea as the domestic economy has strengthened and become internationalized. However, as with the process for the liberalization of goods, pressure from the international community has also
been a factor behind the recent changes. In part due to the fact that
patterns of trade in goods are significantly affected by national laws
and regulations governing direct foreign investment, and in part due to
the independent importance of direct investment to the world economy, advanced developed countries have taken an interest in attempting to open the world to the relatively unrestrained access to equity
investment in local markets.
As with the prior section of this article on the regulation of the
import of goods, the object of this section is to analyze the legal underpinnings of Korea's regulation of direct foreign investment, to provide
some historical perspective on the liberalization of this regulation and
to suggest the direction of future liberalization efforts.
1. The Foreign Capital Inducement Act and the Regulation of
Foreign Investment
Korea is certainly not unique in controlling foreign investment.
National laws on foreign investment are very diverse, ranging from
countries which are almost entirely closed to equity investment by foreign investors to countries which give special incentives to foreign investors not otherwise available to local investors. 27 Many countries
have special legislation governing the entry and operation of foreign
investment in their territories which typically provides for the types of
investment projects permitted, systems for administering the approval
of permitted projects, performance requirements and other applicable
controls, as well as incentives for desired foreign investment. While
such legislation is less common in advanced industrial countries, even
26. Super 301 Import Agreement, supra note 22, para. B(1).
27. See 4 W. STRENG & J. SALACUSE, INTERNATIONAL
(1983).

BUSINESS PLANNING

§ 19.05
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countries such as the United States have certain restrictions on sectors
in which foreign investment is not desired, such as in national security
areas, and impose certain reporting obligations for significant
investments.
Korea's system for regulating foreign investment is governed by
the Foreign Capital Inducement Act ("FCIA"). 28 Though approval
of some types of foreign investment in Korea, such as the acquisition
of existing shares by a foreign party, is theoretically available pursuant
to the Foreign Exchange Control Act, 29 foreign direct equity investment is approved pursuant to the FCIA. The FCIA in principle permits foreign investment in all industries except those identified op a
negative list as prohibited or restricted and those specially designated
as reserved for "small and medium-sized" enterprises. In cases of restricted projects or those reserved for smaller enterprises, foreign investment may be permitted subject to special criteria.
All projects which are not prohibited are subject to one of two
approval tracks: "automatic approval" ("AA") through the Bank of
Korea ("BOK") for projects with a foreign investment ratio of less
than fifty percent and meeting certain other requirements, and a more
detailed and time consuming approval through the Ministry of Finance ("MOF") for projects which do not qualify for AA approval by
the BOK. The MOF approval process includes the participation of
additional concerned ministries which will be consulted and which
will conduct economic and feasibility studies of the project. 30 The
MOF will also request the Economic Planning Board to determine
whether the application, particularly the joint venture agreement if the
investment is in the form of a joint venture, contains any unjust or
unfair provisions according to the Monopoly Regulation and Fair
Trade Act. 3 Unfair trade provisions in joint venture agreements are
set forth in Economic Planning Board Public Notice No. 89-5, Scope
and Criteria of Unfair Trade Practices in International Agreements
("EPB Unfair Trade Criteria").3 2 If the agreement is found to violate
28. Foreign Capital Inducement Act, Law No. 1802 (1966), amended by Law No. 3691
(1983).
29. Foreign Exchange Control Act, Law No. 933 (1961), amended by Law No. 1920 (1967).
30. FCIA, art. 35, Law No. 1802 (1966), amended by Law No. 3691 (1983).
31. Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Law No. 3320 (1980), amended by Law No.
3875 (1986).
32. Scope and Criteria of Unfair Trade Practices in International Agreements, Economic
Planning Board Public Notice No. 89-5 (Sept. 29, 1989) (unofficial translation) [hereinafter referred to as EPB Unfair Trade Criteria]. Article 4 of the EPB Unfair Trade Criteria provides
that the following shall constitute unfair trade practices if found in joint venture agreements: (1)
if the raw materials, components, equipment, related products, etc. of the proposed investment
project are unreasonably required to be purchased from the foreign investor or from a person
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the EPB Unfair Trade Criteria, such as if raw materials, components,
equipment, and other items are unreasonably required to be purchased
from the foreign investor or its designee, then removal or modification
of the provision may be required. A proposed investment of over
US$5 million further requires approval by the Foreign Capital Project
Review Committee. Upon review of the opinions of the concerned
ministries and the EPB, the MOF will issue its approval and, in doing
so, has discretion to set forth conditions to the approval.
In this outline sketch of the foreign investment approval process,
three basic features of Korea's regulation of foreign investment
emerge. First, as with the regulation of imports under the Foreign
Trade Act, the regulation of foreign investment under the FCIA employs a negative list system which restricts or prohibits investment in
designated sectors. The FCIA and the Enforcement Decree of the
FCIA ("FCIA Decree") 33 set forth the basic framework for restricted
and prohibited projects and provide broad criteria for such projects.
The FCIA provides that the Minister of Finance shall approve foreign
investment without delay unless it falls under certain designated categories, including an investment made in a restricted project.3 4 The
FCIA Decree defines in general terms such restricted projects as those:
(1) "specially supported by the government," (2) "with a high consumption level of energy and a high ratio of imported raw materials,"
(3) "resulting in heavy pollution," (4) "considered extravagant or resulting in non-productive consumption," (5) "affecting the subsistence
of farmers and fishermen" and (6) "other projects whose industry is in
the initial development stage and for which protection is deemed necessary for a certain period under industrial strategy."' 35 Similarly, the
FCIA itself generally defines prohibited investment projects, which include projects reserved for the public sector, those which cause harm
designated by the foreign investor; (2) if the export of the products manufactured by the joint
venture company to territories other than those wherein the foreign investor is itself engaging in

ordinary sales activities or wherein a third party is given an exclusive right of distribution, is
prohibited or requires a prior approval; (3) if the products manufactured by the joint venture
company are required to be exported only through the foreign investor or through a person
designated by the foreign investor; provided, however, that this will not be deemed to be a pro-

hibited unfair trade practice if the foreign investor or the person designated by the foreign investor is obligated to accept such products only at appropriate times and at prices and conditions
which are internationally reasonable; and (4) if the terms of the agreement are, in light of the
customary practices in international contracts, unreasonably against the interest of the domestic

investor.
33. Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Capital Inducement Act, Presidential Decree No.
11,460 (June 30, 1984), amended by Presidential Decree No. 12,861 (Dec. 27, 1989), [hereinafter
FCIA Decree].

34. FCIA,art. 7(2) Law No. 1802 (1966), amended by Law No. 3691 (1983).
35. FCIA Decree, supra note 33, art. 9.
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to health and sanitation, and those which violate public policy. 36
The specific industry sectors which comprise these generally-defined restricted and prohibited projects are set forth in the MOF's
Guidelines for Foreign Investment, the most recent edition of which
was published in December, 1989 ("FCIA Guidelines"). 37 The 999 industry sectors which are covered by the FCIA Guidelines have been
38
classified according to the Korean Standard Industrial Classification.
The prohibited and restricted sectors among these are set forth in attachments to the FCIA Guidelines. 39 The restricted projects will not
be approved by the Minister of Finance unless the Minister has previously set criteria for the approval of investment in the specific sector40
Such "Criteria for Permitting Foreign Investment in Restricted Industries" is set forth in Attachment IV to the FCIA Guidelines and includes criteria for investment in restricted sectors such as general
foreign trade, life insurance, and advertising agencies. For example,
while the advertising agency industry is presently restricted, the criteria for approval provide that approval may be granted if the foreign
equity ratio is less than fifty percent and certain other conditions are
met. As of January, 1990, the foreign equity ratio in the advertising
agency industry will no longer be restricted.
Second, sectors which are not on the foreign investment negative
list are not necessarily eligible for the AA process. This AA process is
only one of the two foreign investment approval tracks open to
projects which are not prohibited; the other is a full MOF review and
approval. By authority which has been delegated by the MOF, 4 1 the
BOK grants "automatic approval" to foreign investment projects
which meet the following criteria:
1. The ratio of shares to be subscribed for by the foreign investor
is less than fifty percent;
2. The total amount of foreign capital to be induced is less than
US$100,000,000;
3. The investment is to be made in a manufacturing project;
4. No tax benefits are sought; and
5. The investment is to be made in a project which is not on the
36. FCIA,art. 9, Law No. 1802 (1966), amended by Law No. 3691 (1983).
37. Guidelines for Foreign Investment, Ministry of Finance Notification No. 89-19 (Dec.,
1989) [hereinafter FCIA Guidelines].
38. Id., art. 1.
39. Article 4 of the FCIA Guidelines provides that "Prohibited Projects" are set forth in
Attachment I of the Guidelines, and Article 5 indicates that the "Restricted Projects" are set
forth in Attachment II. Id., arts. 4, 5.
40. Id., art. 5.
41. FCIA Decree, supra note 33, art. 46(2)(1).
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negative.list.42
Thus, pursuant to item 5 of the criteria, the BOK AA process is not
available for investment projects which are on the negative list. However, even projects which are not on the negative list are eligible for
BOK approval only if the project also satisfies items 1 through 4 of the
criteria.
While eligible investments are approved by the BOK within ten
days, all other investments must receive full MOF approval which typically takes from thirty to sixty days and includes the participation of
other concerned ministries. Alhough the approval process undertaken
by the BOK is not truly "automatic," the BOK's review is more limited than the MOF process both in theory and in practice. For example, as noted in the foregoing, the MOF must consult with the EPB
regarding potentially discriminatory provisions in joint venture agreements pursuant to the EPB Unfair Trade Criteria. 43 On the other
hand, pursuant to BOK review, the EPB is not consulted in connection with the EPB Unfair Trade Criteria. Morevoer, in part because of
time constraints, the BOK does not perform as rigorous a review of
the EPB Unfair Trade Criteria. Furthermore, even though in theory
the BOK, through authority delegated by the MOF, is required to review the terms and conditions of the contract, the size and contents of
required foreign capital, and the production and sales plans," in practice, projects which are eligible for AA are seldom interfered with in
the BOK approval process. Thus, for the foreign investor the AA
track is an efficient alternative that entails less risk that the Korean
government will seek to modify the investment plans.
Third, other requirements may apply to investment projects. For
example, foreign investment in three sectors - construction, non-life
insurance, and certain alcohol production - must take the form of a
joint venture with an existing company authorized or licensed for that
area of business, and in a limited number of other sectors must take
the form of a joint venture undertaken only with an existing company
engaged in the'same business. 45 As another example, local equity participation requirements are found in certain individual laws, such as
the Petroleum Refining Law, Mining Law, Fisheries Law and the Phonogram and Videotape Manufacturing Law.
However, some of the more significant additional restrictions
42. See FCIA, art. 7(2), Law No. 1802 (1966), amended by Law No. 3691 (1983); FCIA
Decree, supra note 33, art. 8(2).
43. FCIA Guidelines, supra note 37, art. 12(3).
44. See FCIA Decree, supra note 33, art. 7.

45. FCIA Guidelines, supra note 37, art. 7.

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 11:423

which may apply to foreign and domestic investors alike are the investment permission requirements which apply to "small and medium-sized" enterprises. The MOF may approve foreign investment in
either of the two "small and medium-sized" enterprise categories one applying to "projects inherent to small and medium-sized enterprises" ("Inherent Sectors") and the other to "small and mediumsized systematized items" ("Systematized Items") - only if the in46
vestment meets certain requirements.
Inherent Sectors have been reserved to smaller enterprises in an
effort to promote their development in an economy known for the
dominance of very large companies. Generally, a "large" foreign company, as defined on the basis of total employees and assets 4 7 may form
a joint venture with or make a capital investment in an existing domestic "small and medium-sized" enterprise as long as the foreign-invested equity ratio in the domestic enterprise is less than fifty percent
after the joint venture and does not exceed fifty percent after the capital investment.4 8 However, if the foreign company is itself considered
to be a "small and medium-sized" enterprise, it may generally invest
in a "small and medium-sized" domestic company, regardless of
whether the investment results in the creation of a joint venture or a
49
subsidiary.
Systematized Items also promote smaller enterprises by requiring
that designated parts and components within certain industries generally be produced by "small and medium-sized" enterprises. Foreign
investment in projects to manufacture such designated Systematized
Items may be permitted by a foreign company of any size if the foreign-invested company is a "small and medium-sized" enterprise.50
However, even if the foreign-invested company desiring to manufacture a Systematized Item is a large enterprise, government approval
may be obtained if the project is a joint venture with a Korean company specially designated to produce the Systematized Item. 5 A
wholly-owned subsidiary may even be approved if such a specially designated Korean company is unable to manufacture the Systematized
46. FCIA Guidelines, supra note 37, art. 8.
47, The standards distinguishing a "small and medium-sized enterprise" from a "large enterprise" are provided under the Small and Medium Industry Basic Act, Law No. 1840, amended
by Law No. 3650 (1982) and its Enforcement Decree. Generally, a manufacturing business can
be classified as a small and medium-sized enterprise if the number of employees is not more than
300 to 700 and the total assets is not more than 8 to 12 billion Korean won, depending on the

respective nature of each manufacturing business.
48. See FCIA Guidelines, supra note 37, at Attachment III, § I.
49. Id.
50. Id. § 2.
51. Id.

Winter 1990]

Korean Import and Investment Regulation

Item. 52
2.

Liberalization of Foreign Investment Regulation

The negative list system is a relatively recent feature of Korea's
foreign investment law and was incorporated into the FCIA when the
Act was totally revised on December 31, 1983, taking effect on July 1,
1984. Before this revision, the Act used a "positive system," which
allowed foreign investment only in specifically designated industrial
sectors. The AA approval track is also quite new. Although the outline of the AA system was first set forth as part of the amended FCIA
effective July 1, 1984, its present structure was adopted only when authority for its implementation was delegated to the BOK on July 1,
1987.
In the early years of the post-Korean-war regulation of foreign investment, beginning as early as January, 1960 with the Foreign Investment Encouragement Act, the Korean government actively sought
foreign capital to begin to rebuild the economy. For instance, it was
lenient to foreign investors even if equivalent local industry capabilities were already in existence. 53 However, after 1973 as the economy
strengthened and the Korean government gained bargaining power
over foreign investors, the government began to enact restrictions, including sectoral preferences, limits on equity holdings and the incorporation of minimum investment amounts.5 4 This trend began to be
reversed in 1980, in part due to difficulties in the economy, and new
guidelines marked the beginning of a foreign investment liberalization
5
program. 5
Although a liberalization process had already begun, the adoption
of the negative list system in 1984 was the initial major revision toward the current relatively liberalized state of foreign investment. The
negative list has since been gradually shortened, with the result that
very few sectors are currently restricted or prohibited. The "liberalization ratio" of foreign investment, which reflects the percentage of
industries as defined by the Korean Standard Industrial Classification
not on the negative list, increased from 60 percent in 1983 to 76.3
percent in 1985 and 78.9 percent in 1987, remaining approximately the
52. Id.
53. See Kim, Foreign Investment Law of Korea, in BUSINESS LAWS IN KOREA 191 (Chan-Jin
Kim ed.) (2d ed. 1988).
54. Cho, Incentives and Restraints:Government Regulation of Direct Investments between Korea and the United States, in FROM PATRON TO PARTNER: THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.KOREAN BUSINESS AND TRADE RELATIONS 45-46 (K. Moskowitz ed. 1984).

55. Kim, supra note 53, at 192-93.
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same in 1989.56 The liberalization ratio for manufacturing industries
alone for the same years was 66.8 percent in 1983, 92.5 percent in
7
1985, and about 97.5 percent in 1987 and 1989.5
As previously noted, the liberalization of foreign investment in service sectors has been a particularly noteworthy development. Among
the recent changes affecting service sectors are a reduction in restrictions on the participation of foreign-invested firms in trading activities,
the issuance of guidelines for licensing joint ventures in life insurance,
the gradual liberalization of foreign investment by advertising agencies, and the opening of movie production and distribution to foreign
investment.58
Some specific examples of continued progress include the liberalization of the wholesaling of pharmaceutical products as of July 1,
1989, the manufacture of medicaments as of January 1, 1990, and the
scheduled liberalization of the wholesaling of cosmetics and toiletries
as of July 1, 1990. 59 These liberalization measures were anticipated
earlier in Paragraph D(8) of the Super 301 Investment Agreement, in
which Korea also agreed to remove travel agency services from the
negative list by January 1, 1991,60 as well as further liberalize advertising agency investment requirements and eventually remove this sector
from the negative list, also by January 1, 1991.61 The Super 301 Investment Agreement further provides that the Korean government
will neither add sectors to the negative list nor move sectors from the
restricted list onto the prohibited list.62
Eligibility for the BOK's AA process is also being expanded to a
broader range of investment projects. Effective January 1, 1990, the
prior maximum of US$3 million eligible for AA was increased to
US$100 million for investments otherwise satisfying the AA
63
requirements.
If the provisions of the Super 301 Investment Agreement are implemented, 64 after January 1, 1993, Korea will shift to a notification
system allowing foreign investors in both manufacturing and service
sectors to proceed with their investments within sixty days of notifica56. The author has compiled these statistics from various Ministry of Finance reports.
57. Id.
58. REPUBLIC OF KOREA ECONOMIC PLANNING BOARD, KOREA-U.S. ECONOMIC RELA-

TIONSHIP -

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

ISSUES AND PROSPECTS 10 (1989).

Id.
Super 301 Investment Agreement, supra note 22, para. D(5).
Id. para. D(7).
Id. para. B(l).
FCIA Decree, supra note 33, amendment No. 12,861 (Dec. 27, 1989).
See Super 301 Investment Agreement, supra note 22, para. D(3), D(4).
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tion to the Korean government unless the project falls into one of
three categories: (1) it is on the negative list, in which case the MOF
may impose conditions on approval, (2) the project is disapproved by
the Korean government for reasons of national security, public order,
health, morality or safety, international peace and security obligations,
monopolistic and predatory practices or violations of the Monopoly
Regulation and Fair Trade Act, or (3) the project is subject to certain
defined "performance requirements" which will continue to be applicable to foreign investment. Among the performance requirements
which will continue to be applicable are the requirements, as previously discissed, that a foreign investor may participate in certain limited sectors only through a joint venture, that certain foreign investor
equity limitations may be imposed by various individual laws, and that
certain "small and medium-sized" enterprise restrictions may apply to
certain sectors.
The Super 301 Investment Agreement defines performance requirements in broad terms to include the acceptance or achievement of
a given level or percentage of local equity, the export of goods or services, the transfer of technology and requirements for the use of Korean
products or services. 65 The Super 301 Investment Agreement also indicates that, apart from specified exceptions, the Korean government
as of July 1, 1989 will no longer impose performance requirements on
a foreign investor as a condition for permitting an investment or re66
ceiving any incentive.
III.

THE ROLE OF KOREA'S TRADE ACTIONS

Now that Korea has greatly liberalized its regulation of imports
and the flow of imports into Korea has been accelerating, a broader
range of domestic interests may claim they are being harmed by this
increase in import penetration, including penetration due to unfair
trade practices of foreign producers and exporting countries.
Although they have not been actively used thus far, many laws and
regulations have been adopted which are designed to provide remedies
for domestic interests faced with unfairly imported goods or harmed in
65. Paragraph A(4) of the Super 301 Investment Agreement provides as follows:

Performance requirements are requirements to: a) export goods or services; b) substitute
goods or services from Korea for imported goods or services or accord preference to goods
or services produced in Korea; c) use local contents; d) accept or achieve a given level or
percentage of local equity; e) transfer or license technology; f) restrict remittances related to
investment; g) limit manufacturing to prescribed product lines; h) manufacture in Korea; or

i) shift production, distribution or marketing facilities or techniques to Korean nationals
through government-imposed measures.
66. Id. para. A(l).
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other ways by the imported goods. These laws and regulations most
prominently include antidumping and countervailing duty laws and
other legislation providing for temporary import restrictions under
various circumstances.
The object of this section of the article is to introduce Korea's principle unfair trade practice actions, its antidumping and countervailing
duty laws (with particular emphasis on the main features of the antidumping law), and to compare these actions and laws with those in
the United States. Next, this section will introduce Korea's principle
safeguard actions. These are designed not to respond to unfair trade
actions, but to temporarily restrict imports to allow domestic interests
time to adjust to competition from these imports.
A. Antidumping Law
Korea first adopted some form of an antidumping law in 1963 as
part of the Customs Act. Major sets of statutory revisions occurred in
1969 and 1983,67 the Customs Act's Presidential Decree was significantly revised in 1986, in part to conform the law to Korea's obligations under article VI of GATT, which Korea joined in 1967, and the
GATT Antidumping Code, which Korea signed in 1986.68 Article 10
of the current Customs Act sets forth the basic substance of Korea's
antidumping law:
In cases where the importation of foreign goods for sale at a price lower
than the normal value causes or threatens to cause material injury to a
domestic industry or materially retards the establishment of a domestic
industry (hereinafter in this Article referred to as "material injury,
etc."), if deemed necessary to protect the domestic industry concerned, a
duty may be imposed (hereinafter referred to as "antidumping duty") in
addition to the customs duty charged pursuant to the dutiable value of
the goods concerned, in an amount equal to or less than the difference
between the normal value and the dumping price (hereinafter referred to
as "margin of dumping") of such goods, by specifying the goods, exporter or exporting country of such goods prescribed by the Presidential
Decree.69

While the basic elements of this antidumping provision are broadly
similar to those found in the antidumping laws of other jurisdictions,
such as the United States, administering authorities in Korea retain a
relatively high degree of discretion in imposing antidumping duties.
For example, under United States law, administrative discretion in im67. For a description of the 1983 revisions, see Lee, The Korean Anti-Dumping Law, 13 KoREAN J. CoMP. L. 147 (1985).

68. See Kim, The New Antidumping Law of Korea-Countermeasureto Foreign Assault, in
BUSINESS LAWS IN KOREA, supra note 53, at 684-85.

69. Customs Act, Law No. 1976 (1967), amended by Law No. 4027 (1988).

Winter

1990]

Korean Import and Investment Regulation

posing antidumping duties has been limited. If foreign goods are being
sold in the United States at less than fair value, and if the import or
sale of the foreign goods materially causes or threatens to cause material injury to an industry in the United States or materially retards the
establishment of an industry, "there shall be imposed" an antidumping
duty in an amount equal to the amount by which the foreign market
value exceeds the United States price for the merchandise. 70 By contrast, according to article 10(1) of the Korean Customs Act, under
similar circumstances, a duty "may be imposed." Thus this imposition
is not mandatory. Article 10(1) has taken into account article 8(a) of
the GATT Antidumping Code which states that it is desirable that the
imposition of duties be permissive.
It should further be noted that Korea has adopted the so-called
"lesser duty" rule, 7 1 which provides that the full margin of dumping
need not be imposed, but may be "in an amount equal to or less than
the difference between the normal value and the dumping price ......
In contrast, U.S. law does not offer the option of imposing a duty
amount less than the full margin of dumping. Korea shares the adop72
tion of this "lesser duty" rule with jurisdictions such as the EEC.
Here again the basic discretion remains in the hands of the Minister of
Finance and also reflects article 8(a) of the GATT Antidumping Code,
which states that it is desirable that a duty less than the margin should
be imposed if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury
of the domestic industry.
1. Substantive Requirements for Antidumping Duties
Apart from the .relatively high degree of discretion granted to administering authorities in imposing antidumping duties in Korea, Korea's basic substantive determination of the two main factors of
dumping and injury to a domestic industry is quite similar to the substantive law of the United States. Korea, however, adds the third requirement that the duty may be imposed "if deemed necessary to
73
protect the domestic industry concerned.'
In the dumping determination, in which the "normal value" of the
goods must be compared to their "dumping price," the Enforcement
70. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988) (emphasis added).
71. See Customs Act, art. 10, para. 1.
72. See Vermulst, The Anti-Dumping Systems ofAustralia, Canada, the EEC and the United
States of America: Have Anti-Dumping Laws Become a Problem in International Trade? 10
MICH. J. INT'L L. 765, 773-75 (1989).
73. Customs Act, art. 10(1).
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Decree of the Customs Act (hereinafter "Customs Decree") 74 provides
for three alternative methods of deriving "normal value."'75 Similar to
U.S. law, if the ordinary price of identical or similar goods cannot be
determined due to the absence of trade in the goods in the home country or if the ordinary price cannot otherwise be applied, then the price
at which the goods are exported to a third country, or a "component
price" of the goods, shall be used. While under U.S. law, foreign market value based on sales to a third country is generally preferred to
that which is based on constructed value (known as "component
price" in U.S. law), if adequate information is available and can be
verified, Korean law does not specify a preference between third country sales and component price.
As for the injury determination, Korean law, like U.S. law and
consistent with GATT, provides that the injury must be "material."
Although this term is not defined, certain managerial regulations
promulgated under the Customs Act 76 provide that the injury must be
"clearly anticipated" and "urgent." ' 77 This material injury must harm
a "domestic industry," defined as "the whole domestic producers of
goods identical, homogeneous or similar to the imported goods concerned or a group of domestic producers occupying a considerable
portion of the gross domestic output ....
"78 United States law similarly provides that the injury may be to either "domestic producers as
a whole of a like product, or those producers whose collective output
of the like product constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic
production of that product . . .," and also specifically provides conditions under which a product market may be subdivided into two or
more markets. 79 Under prior law in Korea, an injury determination
was based upon the total domestic production of a product.80
Apart from the dumping and injury determinations, Korean law
adds a third element which must be satisfied before a duty may be
imposed: the duty must be "deemed necessary to protect the domestic
industry concerned." If the Minister of Finance determines that the
74. Enforcement Decree of the Customs Act, Presidential Decree No. 4449 (Dec. 10, 1969),
amended by Presidential Decree No. 12,572 (Dec. 31, 1988) [hereinafter Customs Decree].
75. Customs Act, arts. 4-2.
76. Managerial Regulations on Antidumping Duties and Countervailing Duties, Notification
No. 89-6, Ministry of Finance (Feb. 15, 1989) [hereinafter Managerial Regulations] (unofficial
translation).
77. Id. art. 17(3).
78. Customs Decree, supra note 74, art. 4-4(1).
79. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(4)(A) & (C).
80. Former article 4-2(5) of the Customs Decree, supra note 74. See Lee, The Korean AndDumping Law, supra note 67, at 153-54.
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domestic industry need not be protected, he may decide not to initiate
an investigation or impose antidumping duties. While the Customs
Act and the Customs Decree did not for some time set forth criteria to
determine whether the domestic industry needed protection, article 18
of the current version of the Managerial Regulations specifies that the
following factors shall be taken into account in considering the necessity for protecting a domestic industry: whether the duties will remove
the injury, the impact on domestic prices, the impact on exports and
on relevant industries, the comparison of the efficiency of protecting
the domestic industry with other industrial and trade policy means,
whether the merchandise is in a category of favored items under industry support and promotion-oriented acts, and other public policy
grounds.
2.

Other ProceduralFeatures

In addition to the Minister of Finance's relatively high degree of
discretion in imposing antidumping duties, the other procedural requirements of Korean antidumping law generally are also discretionary. However, recent amendments have indicated some movement
toward limiting the Minister's discretion in deciding whether to initiate an investigation and have imposed certain investigatory time
deadlines.
An antidumping investigation may be requested by an affected private party or by a ministry with jurisdiction over the concerned industry, or it may be self-initiated by the Minister of Finance.8 ' Even with
sufficient evidence detailing the importation of dumped goods, material injury, and other elements of dumping, the Customs Act apparently contemplates that the initiation of an investigation still remains
in the Minister's discretion.8 2 However, the Customs Decree was
amended on December 31, 1988 to provide that the Minister shall
have the Customs Deliberation Committee begin deliberations on
whether to initiate an investigation within three months of receiving a
request for duty imposition. 3 The Managerial Regulations further
provide that the Minister shall in principle commence an investigation
unless there is insufficient evidence of dumping and injury; an insignificant dumping margin, level of imports or degree of injury; or if other
satisfactory measures have been taken prior to the initiation of the investigation.8 4 The Customs Decree amendment and the Managerial
81.
82.
83.
84.

Customs Act, arts. 10(2), (3).
Customs Act, art. 10(3).
Customs Decree, supra note 74, art. 4-5(1).
See Managerial Regulations, supra note 76, arts. 6(3), (4).
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Regulations emphasize the need for the Minister to give all new actions to the Customs Deliberation Committee for review and to dismiss an action prior to full investigation only under certain specified
circumstances.
Korea provides for the formation of investigation teams for the
dumping and injury determinations, similar to the approach under
U.S. law and in contrast to the single investigation team approach
under EEC law. Until very recently, if the Minister decided to initiate
an investigation, the Customs Deliberation Committee would form
two investigation teams--one consisting of MOF officials to investigate dumping, and one composed of Korean Trade Commission
("KTC") members or officials of the ministry in charge of the merchandise under investigation to investigate injury.85 However, a December 21, 1989 amendment to the Foreign Trade Act,8 6 to be
discussed below, provides at article 40 that a newly strengthened Korean Trade Commission in the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI)
will conduct an investigation as to material injury in antidumping and
countervailing duty actions if the investigation is requested by the
Minister of Finance upon the recommendation of the Customs Deliberation Committee. The full effect of this change will not be known
until the FTA Decree and other provisions are amended to offer further explanation.
Until recently, the only time limitation imposed upon the investigations was that they shall terminate within one year of inception unless special reasons call for an extension.8 7 While the Korean Trade
Commission's new ability- to conduct injury investigations calls into
question the applicability of current investigatory deadlines under the
Customs Act, Customs Decree amendments effective as of December
31, 1988 provide for intermediate deadlines and indicate a trend toward greater formality in conducting investigations. First, upon receiving a request to impose duties, the Minister of Finance shall,
within three months of receiving the request, have the Customs Deliberation Committee deliberate on whether it is necessary to begin an
investigation.88 Second, the investigation shall be closed within six
months after initiation and a report submitted to the Customs Deliberation Committee, unless the Committee otherwise determines to extend the investigation.8 9 Third, within one month after the
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. art. 7.
Law No. 4145 (Dec. 21, 1989).
Customs Act, art. 10(6).
Customs Decree, supra note 74, art. 4-5(1).
Id. arts. 4-5(12).
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investigation is suspended or closed, the Customs Deliberation Committee shall determine whether it is necessary to take an antidumping
measure pursuant to the investigation's finding and submit its determination to the Minister of Finance. 90 Thus, while the time limitations
do not begin to approach the complexity and formality of U.S. antidumping law, these amendments impose some intermediate time
restrictions.
3.

Investigations to Date

The real test of the Korean antidumping law will of course rest
with its application. To date, however, only six investigations have
been initiated, including a second investigation of the first antidumping action brought in April, 1986, and none have resulted in the imposition of duties. Chart No. 1 indicates the date of these investigations,
the product, claimant, respondent and the result.
Based on these few investigations, some tentative observations can
be made. Thus far, the Korean government has not initiated antidumping investigations - the initiators have been private companies
and, in one case, an industry association. Second, no duties have yet
been imposed. The MOF has indicated that this result is not coincidental but stems from an emphasis on obtaining undertakings from the
parties suspected of dumping. 91 Such undertakings, as authorized by
article 10(8) of the Customs Act, may take the form of a revision in
price to eliminate the injury resulting from dumping or a promise to
cease export of the goods. This policy appears to be in part an outgrowth of Korea's perceived vulnerability as a relatively small country
which is highly dependent on exporting its own products. While the
imposition of dumping duties could potentially invite retaliation from
other countries against Korean exports, undertakings may be per92
ceived to be less disruptive to Korea's relations with other countries.
B.

Important Features of Other Trade Actions
1. Countervailing Duty Law

The Korean countervailing duty law is very similar to the antidumping law apart from the requirements governing the imposition
of subsidies or bounties. The Customs Act sets forth the basic countervailing duty requirements:
In a case where the importation of goods on which any subsidies or
90. Id. art. 4-5(13).
91. Conversations with Ministry of Finance officials.
92. Id.
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bounties (hereinafter referred to as "subsidies, etc.") are granted directly
or indirectly by any foreign country upon their manufacture, production
or export causes or threatens to cause material injury to a domestic industry or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry
(hereinafter in this article referred to as "material injury, etc."), and
where it is deemed necessary to protect the domestic industry concerned,
a duty may be imposed in addition to the customs duty charged on the
basis of the dutiable value, in an amount equal to or less than the amount
of the subsidies (hereinafter referred to as "countervailing duty"), by
specifying the goods and exporter or exporting
country of such goods, as
93
prescribed by the Presidential Decree.
In contrast to the countervailing duty law of the United States, the
Minister of Finance retains discretion in initiating an investigation
even if subsidies or bounties are found which cause material injury.
Furthermore, a duty is imposed only when it is deemed necessary to
protect the domestic industry, and the amount of the duty may be less
than the amount of the subsidy. In the United States, it is mandatory
for the administering authority to assess a duty if the requisite elements of a countervailable duty are found to exist. It should also be
noted that a "material injury" requirement applies in Korean countervailing duty law. To date, there have been no countervailing duty investigations in Korea.
2. Safeguard Actions Under the Foreign Trade Act
and the Customs Act
Among Korea's safeguard measures are those administered by the
Minister of Finance pursuant to the Customs Act, including a tariff
quota system provided for under article 16 and two other provisions
which will be focused on below: an emergency duty provision under
article 12 and an adjustment duty under article 12-2. An additional
safeguard-type provision is administered by the MTI under the Foreign Trade Act and the FTA Decree. While the Customs Act emergency duty and adjustment duty provisions employ broadly-defined
criteria for taking action against imports and include a weak or even
no injury requirement, the provisions of the Foreign Trade Act action
have recently been significantly amended, in part providing for a material injury standard.
a. Customs Act Safeguard Actions
Of particular breadth and lacking an apparent injury component,
article 12 of the Customs Act permits the imposition of an "emergency
duty" of up to an additional forty percent over the stated customs
93. Customs Act, art. 13(1) (emphasis added).
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duty in three separate cases: (1) if there is "an urgent need to protect a
domestic industry which is important in relation to the national economy," (2) if there is "an urgent need to discourage the importation of
particular goods," or (3) if there is "a need to modify the imbalance in
'94
tariff rates among goods due to a change in the industrial structure.
While the second Customs Act safeguard measure, the article 12-2
"adjustment duty," is also very broadly worded, this provision is at
least limited to goods which have been newly designated in Korea as
items whose import is "automatically approved." '95 Thus, this provision is specifically designed to provide relief from the rapid liberalization of the automatic approval items as referred to earlier in this
article. A customs duty of up to a total of 100 percent may be imposed "if it is necessary to curb the import" of goods in such newly
designated automatic approval items. Even higher duties may be imposed on the import of such newly designated automatic approval
goods which "impair or threaten to impair domestic industry by being
imported at a price remarkably lower than identical or similar
goods."' 96 Such impairment is not defined, nor is guidance given on
the meaning of a "remarkably lower" price. In any event, an adjustment duty may be applied only within three years from the date of
liberalization of the item in question.
No new adjustment duty cases have been initiated since the first
half of 1987.9 7 The standards governing such adjustment duties are
very broad and their application to items liberalized as automatic approval items has created a good deal of friction with Korea's trade
partners such as the United States, particularly in view of the abolition
in January 1989 of the similarly restrictive provisions of the Import
Surveillance System. Out of apparent concern over the trade friction
created by these adjustment duties, the MOF has been reluctant to
conduct new adjustment duty investigations.9 8
b.

The Foreign Trade Act Action

Until recently, a safeguard action provided for in the Foreign
Trade Act shared with the Customs Act safeguard provisions the features of a broad injury standard and a high degree of discretion left in
the hands of administering authorities, whom in the case of the Foreign Trade Act action is the Minister of Trade and Industry, not the
94. Id. art. 12.
95. Customs Act, art. 12-2(1).

96. Id. art. 12-2(2).
97. Conversations with officials of the Customs Bureau, Ministry of Finance.

98. Id.
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Minister of Finance. However, on December 21, 1989, the provisions
of the Foreign Trade Act governing this safeguard action were significantly amended to provide for a material injury standard and to expand the powers of the KTC.
Under former article 32 of the Foreign Trade Act, certain defined
interested parties were entitled to request the Minister of Trade and
Industry to investigate the effect of imported goods on a domestic industry producing goods of the same kind or competitive goods if the
development of the domestic industry "is or may be impeded by a
rapid increase in the import or excess import of such specified
goods.. .9. 9 While guidelines issued pursuant to the Foreign Trade
Act made some attempt to define when a domestic industry has or
may be "impeded," the amendment to article 32 now clearly specifies
that the domestic industry must be "materially injured" or threatened
with material injury. 100 Legislative statements accompanying the proposal for reform indicate that the amendments were in part motivated
by the standards imposed by GATT, which specifies at article XIX
that emergency action against imports may be taken if the imports
cause or threaten "serious injury" to domestic producers. Article 32
has also been expanded to cover injury not only due to a rapid increase
in imported goods but also due to a rapid increase in foreign services
or intellectual property infringements of the imported goods.
Also under the former provisions, the Minister of Trade had discretion over whether to initiate an investigation 10° and whether it was
necessary to form a committee to assist with the investigation. 102
Upon the close of this investigation, the Minister of Trade and Industry was to refer to the KTC the question of whether it was necessary to
take measures and the determination of the contents of such
10 3
measures.
The amendments, however, provide the basis for a more active
KTC. The amended Foreign Trade Act provides that it is the KTC,
not the Minister, which shall determine whether to initiate an investigation.' ° 4 The KTC itself will both conduct the investigation10 5 and
determine the nature and scope of measures to be taken. 0 6 While the
99. Foreign Trade Act, art. 32, Law No. 3895 (1986).
100. Foreign Trade Act, art. 32, Law No. 4145 (1989).
101. Foreign Trade Act, art. 33(1), Law No. 3895 (1986).
102. FTA Decree, supra note 5, art. 67(2), (4).
103. Id. art. 69(1).
104. Foreign Trade Act, art. 33.
105. Id.
106. Id. art. 34.
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former article 34 provided that the measures which could be taken
include import restrictions, "assistance for an improvement of technology and productivity," or "designation of categories of industry
for rationalization," the amendments add other possible measures.
Most significantly, article 34 now provides that the KTC may recommend an increase in tariffs, a form of relief which could previously be
granted by the MOF under the Customs Act safeguard measures but
not by the MTI under the Foreign Trade Act. 107
Lastly, the amendments to the Foreign Trade Act significantly expand the matters which are subject to the deliberation and decision of
the KTC. While the KTC was basically limited to deliberating relief
measures to be taken and other matters which might be referred to it
by the Minister of Trade and Industry, the strengthened KTC is now
empowered to deliberate and decide upon several other matters, including, as noted above, whether to initiate and conduct investigations.10 8 A new power of particular note, as referred to in the earlier
section of this article on antidumping duties, is the KTC's ability to
conduct a material injury investigation in connection with articles 10
and 13 of the Customs Act, respectively governing antidumping and
countervailing duties, upon the request of the Minister of Finance pursuant to the Customs Deliberation Committee's recommendation.
In recognition of the overlap of the provisions under the Foreign
Trade Act and the Customs Act, the amended article 63 of the Foreign Trade Act continues to provide that the provisions of articles 32
to 43 governing the safeguard investigations "shall not be applicable
to" matters relating to the provisions of articles 10 to 16.2 of the Customs Act, which govern antidumping and countervailing duty investigations as well as emergency duty and adjustment duty provisions.
However, due to the KTC's new ability to conduct antidumping and
countervailing duty material injury investigations upon the request of
the MOF, the amended article 63 provides that the Foreign Trade Act
is now applicable to matters relating to the material injury investigations in connection with such Customs Act actions.109
IV.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, Korea's liberalization of restrictions on imports and foreign investment has been far-reaching in scope and has contributed to
107. Id.
108. Id. art. 40.
109. According to MTI officials, five Foreign Trade Act investigations were completed as of
December, 1989 involving ceramics for burners, angora rabbit fur, tiny salted shrimp, red pepper
paste and canned pork. An additional five investigations were pending.
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major structural changes in the Korean economy. The Korean government appears to be no less committed to moving forward with the
opening of the economy and the implementation of previously announced policies and agreements with its trading partners, such as the
Super 301 Import and Investment Agreements.
Yet the Korean government's ability to persevere with its marketopening efforts surely has its limits. While the liberalization measures
are undoubtedly making a strong, albeit difficult to measure contribution toward the vigor of the economy, Korea's GNP and export
growth have slowed, in part due to increased wage costs and an appreciation of the Korean won. Such a slowdown has prompted calls from
some sectors to halt the progress of liberalization. Some such pressure
emanates from within the bureaucracy itself, and those advocates of
market-opening who have often been charged with setting policy and
negotiating trade agreements are not necessarily the same individuals
who are charged with implementation. Furthermore, the Korean government now operates in an environment of heightened competition
among affected interest groups in a society in the midst of a transition
toward a more open and democratic political system. Those who face
potential harm from the market-opening measures may not only resist
further progress but, as suggested in the foregoing, may resort to Korea's various forms of trade actions in their search for some relief. Despite this new environment, however, Korea's legal system stands as
strong evidence of a commitment to opening the economy.
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CHART NO. 1
KOREAN ANTID UMPING INVESTIGA TIONS
Date of Initiation

Product

Claimant

1. April, 1986

Dicumyl
Peroxide

Due Hwa
June, Mill

Result

Respondent(s)
I. Nippon Oil & Fats Co., Ltd.
(Japan)

Undertaking pursuant to
article 10(8), (9), and
(13) of the Customs Act.

2. Concord Chemical Industrial
Co., Ltd. (Taiwan)

Mitsui agreed to cease
exporting after June,
1986.

3. Coin Chemical Industrial Co.,
Ltd. (Taiwan)

The other three offered
to revise their prices
after January, 1987.

4. Mitsui Petrochemical
Industries, Ltd. (Japan)

The MOF accepted the
offers and suspended the
investigation as of
December 18, 1986.
Dumping margins found
as follows:

Same respondents except
Mitsui

Second
investigation in
April, 1988

I. Nippon
2. Concord
3. Coin

24.5%
12.5%
13.6%

In December, 1988,
undertaking extended
until December 31, 1989.
iIf the undertaking is
breached, the MOF will
impose provisional
antidumping duties and
resume the investigation.
Showa Denko Co. (Japan)

The MOF terminated the
investigation under
article 10(5) of the
Customs Act because
injury to a domestic
industry was insignificant
even though a dumping
margin of 54.4% was
found.

Dae Han
Hwasma

Yoshida Industry Co. (Japan)

The MOF terminated the
investigation under
article 10(5) of the
Customs Act because
injury to a domestic
industry was insignificant
even though a dumping
margin of 19.76% was
found.

Alumina
Cement

Union Co.

Lafarge Fondu Internationale
(France)

In a preliminary
investigation, the MOF
recognized a probability
of dumping in the range
of 61.5% to 96.6% and
injury to a domestic
industry and launched a
formal investigation.

Polyacryl
Amite

Yi Yang
Chemical

Alli Collogis (England)
SNF Floegei (France)
Stock Hausen (West Germany)

A preliminary
investigation is being
conducted.

2. April, 1986

Hansin Co.
Acet
Aldehyde

3. October, 1986

Slide
Hwasma

4. September, 1988

5. October, 1989

Source: Ministry of Finance

